Bayesian orthodoxy posits a tight relationship between conditional probability and updating. Namely, the probability of an event A after learning B should equal the conditional probability of A given B prior to learning B. We examine whether ordinary judgment conforms to the orthodox view. In three experiments we found substantial differences between the conditional probability of an event A supposing an event B compared to the probability of A after having learned B. Specifically, supposing B appears to have less impact on the credibility of A than learning that B is true.
Introduction
Let Pr 1 represent the beliefs of an idealized agent who is considering at time 1 the credibilities of events over an outcome space X (finite, for simplicity). Suppose that for some event B # X with Pr 1 (B) > 0 experience intervenes at time 2 to convince the agent that B is (definitely) true. What new distribution Pr 2 should embody the agent's revised beliefs? The Bayesian response (Hacking, 2001, chap. 15 ) is that Pr 2 should be the result of conditioning Pr 1 on B, that is:
(1) UPDATING FOR LEARNED EVENTS: If B # X is learned between times 1 and 2 (and nothing else relevant is learned) then for all events A # X, Pr 2 (A) = Pr 1 (AjB) (provided that Pr 1 (B) > 0).
It is easy to check that Pr 2 as defined by (1) is a genuine probability distribution and that Pr 2 (B) = 1 (as expected). Also, (1) is a consequence of compelling axioms on belief change (Gärdenfors, 1988, Section 5.2) , and its violation exposes the agent to sure-loss betting contracts (Harman, 1999, Section 4.12) . 1 Such normative virtues suggest a psychological question. One way of formulating (1) is that supposing an event B should have the same impact on the credibility of an event A as learning B. Is this true for typical assessments of chance? For example, is the judged probability of a Democratic victory in 2012 supposing that Hilary Clinton is the vice presidential candidate the same as the judged probability of a Democratic victory in 2012 after learning that Clinton, as a matter of fact, is the vice presidential candidate?
The issue is orthogonal to the provenance of conditional probability in the mind, that is, to the way such probabilities are mentally computed. Thus, even if people fail to respect the standard definition E-mail address: jiayingz@princeton.edu (J. Zhao).
1 Violation of (1) can be conceived as failure to respect the invariance of conditional probability for the learned event B. This is because failure to update via (1) yields: Pr 2 (AjB) = Pr 2 (AjX) = Pr 2 (A) -Pr 1 (AjB). Hence, Pr 2 (AjB) -Pr 1 (AjB). We thank David Over and Mike Oaksford for raising this point to us. 
